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ABSTRACT 
 
Conventional wisdom asserts that the American public is ignorant of the Supreme 
Court and thus, the opinions of average citizens are irrelevant, both in the confirmation 
debates regarding nominees to the Supreme Court and as a tool of political mobilization.  In 
light of the Seventeenth Amendment’s direct election of the Senate and the Senate’s advice 
and consent role, mass public opinion is relevant regardless of the sophistication of their 
input.  Moreover, mobilization of mass public approval or disapproval of nominees is a factor 
influencing the strategies of partisan politics in general.  
It is clear that the public is aware of Supreme Court nominees and they evaluate the 
nominees on two different bases.  First, the public evaluates nominees based on an 
ideological model to the extent of the information the public possesses about the ideology of 
nominees.  Second, the public assesses nominees on the basis of judicial qualification and 
suitability for the position of Supreme Court justice, what Gibson and Caldeira refer to as 
“Judiciousness.”  This two part evaluation mirrors part of Abrahams’ model of executive 
decision making for Supreme Court nominations. 
Given that stealth nominees, herein defined as nominees with limited judicial records, 
by their nature provide little insight into their ideological beliefs, they do not provoke 
significant disapproval among the mass public on that basis.  Provided they meet some 
minimum standard of judiciousness, approval of stealth nominees is not negatively affected 
by the lack of knowledge about the nominee’s ideology. Thus, in the cases examined herein 
presidents were able through the nomination of stealth candidates to avoid public disapproval 
their nominees to the Court.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
In the past five years the membership of the Supreme Court of the United States has 
changed dramatically with just less than half of its current members joining the Court in that 
time.  We have gained a new Chief Justice of the Court and three additional Associate 
Justices.  Moreover, many analysts predict that due to the heath of Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, President Obama will likely have at least one more opportunity to nominate a 
Justice during his presidency.  Thus, in seven years’ time we will have seen a majority of the 
Justices on the Court join that body. 
In the most recent addition to the Court, President Obama nominated and the Senate 
confirmed Elena Kagan.  The nomination of Justice Kagan, a former law professor and Dean 
of the Harvard Law School broke from the recent pattern of nominating sitting federal 
judges.  Her nomination came in the immediate wake of the nomination and confirmation of 
Sonia Sotomayor early in Obama’s presidency.  Justice Sotomayor, in contrast to Justice 
Kagan, however, had spent almost two decades on the federal bench before her nomination. 
In nominating these two jurists, President Obama does not appear to be following any 
specific strategy with regard to whether he nominates experienced jurists or nominees with 
limited or no experience on the federal bench. 
President George W. Bush, during his second term in office, also nominated and 
secured the confirmation of two new members of the Court, John Roberts and Samuel Alito.  
These two Bush nominees were both elevated to the Supreme Court from positions on the US 
Court of Appeals.  While Justice Alito had been on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for 
sixteen years, Chief Justice Roberts had spent just two years as a member of the federal 
bench before joining the Supreme Court as its Chief Justice. 
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 The nominations and the subsequent political battles over confirmation for each of 
these recent nominees were the subject of extensive national media coverage.  The process in 
each instance and the individuals themselves were topics of national discussion and public 
scrutiny.  In these cases, as in each modern Supreme Court nomination, one key element to 
the discussions and debates has been mass public opinion on the nominee.  Not only have the 
discussions focused on the ideology of the nominee, but also questions about whether the 
public is satisfied that the nominee is qualified for the position and that the public knows 
enough about the views of the nominee.   
Pointing to the successful and less controversial nomination of John Roberts, some 
argue that when presented with the opportunity to nominate a candidate to the Supreme 
Court, a president should be advised to nominate someone about whom little is known, a so-
called “stealth nominee.”  While the term stealth nominee is not used consistently in either 
the media or scholarly literature, for purposes of this examination, it will be used to mean a 
nominee with a limited judicial record as a member of the federal bench.  Some have also 
used the term to include a nominee who employs evasive tactics with the goal of 
intentionally concealing his or her ideology and opinions during the confirmation process; 
however, tactics used to conceal ideology in the confirmation process are beyond the scope 
of this inquiry and thus that is not part of the definition of stealth nominee used herein.  
Roberts was nominated by President George W. Bush after having spent only two 
years on the Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit.  That followed a decade in spent in private 
legal practice.  His nomination is clearly “stealth”, as defined herein, and he was confirmed 
to the position of Chief Justice by a vote of 78 to 22.  This nomination of a jurist with limited 
experience as a federal judge, and thus about whom little is known, is in contrast to 
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nominations of federal judges with a long tenure on the bench, and thus, a well-establish 
record of jurisprudence such as Samuel Alito and Sonia Sotomayor.  It is reasoned, by 
proponents of the stealth strategy, that it would be hard for the public, or the Senate, to 
disapprove of a candidate about whom they know very little.  
 This concept of strategically nominating “stealth nominees” then raises further 
questions regarding public approval of nominees.  It raises the initial question of whether 
public approval is even a relevant factor to consider in the nomination of justices.  It raises 
questions about whether the public knows enough to evaluate Supreme Court nominees.  
Additionally, it raises the issue of upon what basis the public evaluates nominees to the 
Supreme Court and whether the public believes we should know certain information about a 
nominee’s views before approving of that nominee.  
While much scholarship has been written on the public ignorance of the Supreme 
Court, controversial nominations, and the strategic considerations regarding Senate 
confirmation of nominees, there is less scholarly work in the area of public evaluation of 
nominees, particularly in the context of stealth nominations.  Most commentators generally 
view the successful nomination and confirmation of David Souter as an Associate Justice to 
the Supreme Court as the birth of the “stealth nominee” strategy.  Upon further reflection, 
however, the failed nomination of Douglas Ginsburg also fits the model.  Additionally, the 
nomination and confirmation of John Roberts as Chief Justice is a recent application of the 
“stealth nominee” strategy.  By examining these examples of stealth nominations, I seek to 
evaluate a model of public approval in light of concerns regarding ideology, judicial 
qualification and adequate disclosure.    
4 
 
 
Each of the data sets used in this research have been acquired through the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of 
Michigan.  These data were originally collected by the American Broadcasting Company 
New Division (ABC News) and ABC News, in conjunction with the Washington Post and 
through its subsidiary Chilton Research Services, which have conducted several polls with 
regard to Supreme Court nominations. 
 Reliance on the available data regarding historical public opinion constrains certain 
lines of inquiry based on the nature of the data collected and the form of the questions used.  
While each separate data set necessitates analyzing them independently, generalizations will 
be made based on analogous lines of inquiry in the multiple surveys to develop the models of 
public approval.  Additionally, while the timing and frequency of data collection varies 
slightly between the three polls relied upon, each fits within the proposed model of mass 
public approval.  As has been noted by other researchers, the unexpected nature of Supreme 
Court vacancies and the unspecified process of generating potential nominees, often leads to 
inconsistent and less than comprehensive data collection.  It is only in rare cases that multiple 
polls or panel data have been collected regarding a nominee.  That type of data is available 
for the Clarence Thomas nomination, since his nomination, more than any other has been 
studied and analyzed.  It is not surprising that the data was gathered and is available in the 
case of the Thomas nomination, since it was the subject of such media and academic 
scrutiny.  To a lesser extent, such data is also available for the Samuel Alito nomination.  
Again, the nature of the data collection does not impact the model of public approval 
discussed herein.   
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CHAPTER 2. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 The Supreme Court is the branch of our national government charged with 
adjudicating many of the most controversial issues in American politics.  Increasingly, over 
the second half of the twentieth century, it has been at the center of a firestorm of public 
debate and protest.  It has confronted issues of race, gender, sexuality and reproductive 
health.  Serving in such a prominent role, it could be argued that the Court would be 
prominent in the political concerns of the public.  On the contrary, most research tells us that 
the public is woefully ignorant of the Supreme Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2007 (criticizing 
traditional methodology, while recognizing the axiomatic nature of the point), Gimpel and 
Ringel 1995, Caldeira 1991). 
2.1 Relevance of Public Opinion of Nominees 
While the conventional wisdom about public opinion and Supreme Court nominees 
stresses the ignorance of the masses, a more fundamental question is whether public opinion 
is even relevant. Under the United States Constitution, the general public does not have any 
role in the selection of the Court’s membership, the evaluation of the Court’s functioning or 
holding individual justices accountable to the will of the people.  While some jurisdictions 
within the United States have popularly elected judiciaries or judges subject to retention 
elections, that is not the model of our federal court system.  Our federal court system stresses 
the independence of the judges, with life time terms and isolation from democratic 
accountability once confirmed to the bench.  Thus, one could ask if it matters whether the 
masses pay attention to or have opinions about potential nominees to the Court.   
Despite the lack of a constitutional role in the process, the argument is made that 
public opinions regarding nominees are important, in that the public holds the Senate 
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accountable for its confirmation or rejection of nominees through the election process 
(Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010, Gimpel and Ringel 1995).  While Gimpel and Ringel 
argued that public opinion may impact how senators vote due to evaluation of constituents’ 
views, Kastellec, Lax and Phillips actually developed a model based on state-specific public 
opinion data which showed that public support significantly increased the likelihood of 
senators voting to confirm a nominee (Kastellec, Lax and Phillips 2010, Gimpel and Ringel 
1995).  Following this line of reasoning public opinion has been relevant to the process ever 
since the Progressive Era reform of the Seventeenth Amendment made the Senate popularly 
elected.  Moreover, in the heightened partisanship of late 20th and early 21st century 
American politics, the mobilization of voters over issues of judicial ideology and court 
activism increase the relevance of public opinion as well. 
Regardless of whether Kastellec, Lax and Phillips are correct in their model of a 
direct relationship between mass public opinion and Senate voting, it has been shown that 
senators are aware of and concerned with constituent opinions when they vote on Supreme 
Court nominees (Overby et al., 1992).  It is through this public awareness, and the pressure it 
appears to place on senators, that Presidents utilize the option of “going public” and 
expending political capital to increase the chance of confirmation (Johnson and Roberts 
2004).  The clearly increasing role of interest groups and political advertising in the 
confirmation process would also support that the political process of mobilizing of public 
opinion has an impact (Johnson and Roberts 2004; Segal, Cameron and Cover 1992).    
This politicization of the process and the public role changed with the Robert Bork 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, as well as the later Clarence Thomas hearings.  These 
two confirmation hearings have altered the public’s awareness of and its role in the Supreme 
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Court nomination and confirmation process.  These two nominations, more than any others, 
are cited as the seminal conflicts in the battle for ideological control of the Supreme Court at 
the end of the 20th century (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996).  Not only were they marked by fierce 
debate in elite circles, they involved, grass roots lobbying, advertising and intense media 
scrutiny (Nemacheck 2007; Frankovic and Gelb 1992; Mansbridge and Tate 1992).  In fact, 
these nominations were seen by scholars as so different from the historical norms or previous 
confirmations, that they began to resemble political campaigns more than traditional 
confirmation hearings (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996, 164; citing Overby et al. 1992). 
2.2 Public Ignorance of Nominees 
 The conventional wisdom’s assertion of public inattention to the Supreme Court and 
its proceedings, also applied to the nomination of potential justices at least until the Reagan 
administration (Frankovic and Gelb 1992).  Historically, the nomination and confirmation 
process had been seen as one that was removed from public attention or involvement 
(Frankovic and Gelb 1992).  Article II of the Constitution, provides that the President shall 
have the power “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate” to appoint judges to the 
Supreme Court. (Article II, Section 2, US Constitution).  Prior to the Reagan administration’s 
nominees, polling of the public about nominations, when it had been done, was done to see 
public opinion of newly confirmed justices or of senate action to reject a proposed nominee 
(Frankovic and Gelb 1992, 481 (citing polls on the confirmations of Hugo Black and Felix 
Frankfurter and the rejections of Clement Haynesworth and Harold Carswell). 
Public awareness of the nominees and the role of public opinion changed in 1987 
with Ronald Reagan’s nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court.  With Bork’s 
outspoken political positions, his repeated criticism of the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade 
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and his role in the “Saturday Night Massacre” firing of Watergate Special Prosecutor 
Archibald Cox, he became a major topic of media coverage, and a lightening rod for 
criticism from liberal Democrats in the Senate and liberal interest groups attempting to derail 
his confirmation to the Court (Davis 2005).  His failed nomination led to the coining of the 
verb “Borking”, which is understood to mean sinking a Supreme Court nomination based on 
political/ideological considerations.  It may also be asserted that his failed nomination served 
as a catalyst in the creation of the “stealth nominee” strategy.   
While the post-Bork era has seen considerable scholarship on Supreme Court 
nominees, the scholarship has frequently been focused on the politics within the Senate 
confirmation process (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Gimpel and Wolpert 1995; Shipan 
and Shannon 2003; Johnson and Roberts 2004; Epstein et. al 2006; Nemacheck 2007).  
Robert Bork’s highly publicized and controversial nomination, or more accurately those 
nominations which have followed it, can provide us insights not only into the Senate and its 
role in confirmation, but also public awareness of Supreme Court nominees, public opinions 
regarding nominees and models of their evaluation and approval of nominees during the 
confirmation process.   
Due to the general inattention of the public to the activities and personnel of the 
Supreme Court, one question that is often posed is whether the disputes over nominations, 
even those of visible and controversial nominees, trickle down to the masses (Gimpel and 
Ringel 1995).  Despite the arguments that the Court and its membership should be of 
significant importance to average Americans, many scholars argue that this not the case.  
They assert that generally American citizens know very little about the Court and its 
functions (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996).  In response to phone surveys, most American’s 
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cannot identify the members of the Supreme Court (Gibson and Caldeira 2007).  Not 
knowing even the membership of the Court, scholars assert that the public lacks an 
understanding of the ideology and judicial philosophies of the various justices that make up 
that body.   Moreover, the overwhelming majority of the Court’s decisions, let alone the 
jurisprudential principles upon which they are decided, escape public attention or scrutiny 
(Gimpel and Wolpert 1996). 
A small, but growing school of revisionist scholars counter that the methodology of 
the surveys used in assessing the public’s knowledge of Supreme Court membership is 
simplistic and fails to accurately reflect the public’s knowledge (Gibson and Caldeira 2007; 
Gibson and Caldeira 2009; Hoekstra 2003).  They assert that rather than accurately assessing 
what the public knows about the Court, surveys assess what scholars wish the general public 
knew.  Moreover, the coding of free-response open-ended answers as incorrect in some 
surveys, such as the ANES was questionable (Gibson and Caldeira 2009).  In one example 
cited, responding that William Rehnquist was a Supreme Court Justice was incorrect if the 
respondent did not identify him as the Chief Justice.   
In contrast to the traditional line of inquiry, Gibson and Caldeira demonstrated that 
nearly 80 percent of survey respondents were aware that one Justice was an African-
American.  In response to a follow up question in which they were given multiple choice 
options of name more than 80 percent of those asserting there was an African-American 
justice were able to pick out Clarence Thomas as that individual.  Similarly, more than 80 
percent of respondents were able to answer correctly that there was at least one woman on 
the Court.  Additionally, respondents were successful, although not as much as in the 
previous example, in picking out Sandra Day O’Connor’s name from a list of female federal 
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judges.  Thus, with different question types, the public scored significantly higher than most 
scholars on public awareness of the Court would have one believe.   
Gibson and Caldeira also assert that the public’s knowledge of the appointment 
process and awareness of the concept of judicial review demonstrate a better understanding 
of the Court than many commentators are willing to recognize.  Gibson and Cladeira provide 
data that 44.4 percent of respondents were able to correctly answer that justices are 
appointed, serve a term of life with good behavior and that they have the ultimate say on 
constitutional interpretation (Gibson and Caldeira 2009).  They assert that this demonstrates a 
reasonably sophisticated knowledge of the Court and how it functions.  These results do not 
demonstrate a great degree of sophistication, and additionally they confirm that the majority 
of respondents failed to correctly answer all three of those basic questions about the US 
Supreme Court.  Moreover, the minority of respondents who were able to answer those 
inquiries correctly merely demonstrated a basic knowledge of a political institution at the 
level expected of those seeking to be naturalized as citizens. 
2.3 Models of Public Approval 
As mentioned above, the nature of the Supreme Court nomination and confirmation 
process has changed in the post-Bork era.  The nomination process has become a salient 
aspect of political debate in American society (Nemacheck 2007; Gimpel and Wolpert 1996).  
This public awareness, combined with the campaigning efforts on behalf of nominees, has 
arguably expanded the role of the general public in the debate (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996; 
Gibson and Caldeira 2007).  Thus now, more than ever before in the nomination process, it is 
important to explore public opinions about Supreme Court nominees and about factors upon 
which their approval of confirmation turns.  
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 Even in low salience nominations, where there is initially no major public 
controversy, public opinion is still important because, “[l]atent or unfocused opinions can 
quickly be transformed into intense and very real opinions with enormous political 
repercussions (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996).”  Senators who are concerned about public 
scrutiny of nominee confirmations must then anticipate not only public attitude, but also the 
likelihood of it being inflamed and made an issue relevant to their own reelection to the 
Senate.   
 Senate confirmation hearings of Supreme Court nominees, and public debate over 
them, have often focused on the two key inquiries of judicial qualifications (i.e., experience 
on the bench) and political ideology (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Epstein et. al 2006).  
These are also the first two factors articulated by Abraham in his four factor model of what 
presidents and their advisors consider in evaluating potential nominees (Abraham 1999).  
While Abraham’s model also includes balancing representation on the Court and personal 
friendship as additional factors that drive presidential decision making, those lines of inquiry 
have not been the subject of much research in the area of mass public opinion (Abraham 
1999; Nemacheck 2007).  Some scholars have created models for Senate confirmation voting 
which take into account not only ideology of the nominee, but also the nature of the vacancy 
based on the remaining makeup of the Court, public opinion models are less apt to include 
the court balancing as a factor (Cameron, Cover and Segal 1990; Epstein et. al 2006).  
Gibson and Caldeira have recently put forth two models of public preference in the 
confirmation process, which they call the Policy Agreement Model and the Model of 
Judiciousness (Gibson and Caldeira 2009).  Their Policy Agreement Model is driven by 
assessment, correct or incorrect, by the public about the ideology of a nominee and how 
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closely it mirrors that of the survey respondent.  In their Model of Judiciousness, Gibson and 
Caldeira sought to identify characteristics viewed as important to being a judge (e.g., 
fairness, respect for existing precedent, and the willingness to protect people without power) 
and determine the degree to which the public believed the nominee would embody those 
attributes.  While their model goes beyond mere experience, a long judicial career would tend 
to provide evidence or expectations that a candidate would possess such judicious attitudes 
and behavior.   
 In their research and modeling, Gibson and Caldeira intentionally focused on the 
Samuel Alito nomination because of the fact that it was divisive and controversial.  Much 
like the scholarship on the Bork and Thomas nominations, they viewed the issue of Alito’s 
outspoken conservative views as a vehicle to explore mass public opinion on nominee 
ideology and judiciousness in shaping public opinion.  Thus, they stressed the debate of 
whether Alito’s conservative ideology was perceived by the public as being outside the 
mainstream.  Additionally, they sought to determine whether the public believed Alito’s 
judicial experience would provide him the ability to act in judiciously as a member of the 
Supreme Court.  
In modeling public opinion of controversial Supreme Court nominees, Gibson and 
Caldeira assessed the degree to which ideological distance between the nominee and the 
public determined public approval.  They found that not only ideological distance but also 
partisanship were moderately strong variables in determining public opinion on whether he 
should be confirmed.  Thus, Democrats tended to disapprove of Alito’s confirmation, but so 
long as the majority did not perceive Alito’s views as extreme, they would generally support 
his confirmation. 
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The Gibson and Caldeira model, however, added the factor of judiciousness and 
demonstrated that its relationship to approval eclipsed ideological distance and partisanship 
in the ability to predict approval.  They demonstrated that while a combined model of 
ideology and partisanship could only explain 21 percent of the variance in preference, the 
expectation of judiciousness increased that to a model which predicted 39 percent of 
variance. 
Since Gibson and Caldeira have intentionally developed their model of public 
approval in the context of the divisive and partisan Alito nomination, it remains unclear how 
mass public opinion on ideology would affect approval in stealth nominations, where 
ideology of the nominee is difficult to determine given the limited judicial record as a 
member of the federal bench.  Moreover, since stealth nominations remain largely unstudied, 
it is uncertain whether public approval can be secured by meeting some minimum standard of 
judiciousness, even when the public lacks substantial knowledge of the nominee’s ideology.  
Thus, in this examination I seek to develop a models predicting mass public approval of 
stealth candidates nominated by Republican presidents in the post-Bork context.  Due to the 
nature of stealth nominations, and based on the limited research that exists on stealth 
nominees, I hypothesize that partisanship is less significant than in controversial nominations 
and that approval is more directly influenced by vague assessments of the qualification of the 
nominee.   
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 Given that little scholarly research has focused on models of public approval in 
stealth nominations, this inquiry will seek to analyze available survey data regarding such 
stealth Supreme Court nominees in the Post-Bork era.  Rather than examine post-Bork 
nominations generally, the study will focus on three different examples of stealth Supreme 
Court nominations.  It will begin with the nomination of Douglas Ginsburg in 1987.  It will 
examine the David Souter nomination in 1990.  It concludes with John Roberts’ nomination 
to the Supreme Court in 2005.   
Douglas Ginsburg’s nomination by Ronald Reagan in October of 1987 was the first 
nomination to the Supreme Court in the Post-Bork era.  While his nomination was never 
formalized and he withdrew before going through the confirmation process, his nomination 
serves as a starting point in the post-Bork.  Largely ignored by scholars and not generally 
considered a stealth nomination, it is arguably the proto-stealth nomination.  He was 
nominated at a point in his career when he had less than one year of experience as a member 
of the federal judiciary, making it difficult to assess his ideology and judicial philosophy 
from the limited judicial record.  His nomination is also of interest in that it was a stealth 
nomination which failed due to an excess of information being discovered that derailed his 
nomination.       
 The second data set analyzed herein was collected following the nomination of David 
Souter to the Supreme Court in 1990.  Souter’s nomination to fill the vacancy of William J. 
Brennan, Jr. by President George H.W. Bush is generally credited with being the original 
implementation of the “stealth nominee” strategy.  As the quintessential “stealth nominee”, 
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public opinion on Souter is valuable to developing a working understanding of the factors 
that shape public approval in this context.  
 The final data set examined in this paper is one collected following the nomination of 
John Roberts to the Court in 2005.  His nomination by President George W. Bush is 
considered a recent application of the “stealth nominee” strategy.  As the clearest example of 
a recent use of the “stealth nominee” strategy, it provides critical insights to public 
perceptions of such nominees today and models for public approval.      
 The inquiry into each data set begins with statistical descriptives from the individual 
surveys.  Taking cues from existing literature, this examination explores the perception of 
general public ignorance and apathy with regard to the Supreme Court and its make-up.    
Specific concepts noted include awareness of the public regarding nominees, public approval 
of the nominees, as well as questions regarding how much should be known about the 
political and judicial views of nominees.   
 Following the discussion of descriptive aspects of the survey data, this study 
examines the relationships between variables within the individual data sets.  In each of the 
cases, the inquiry focuses on the critical relationships between nominee approval and 
variables regarding experience/qualification of candidates and ideological beliefs/political 
views and judicial philosophy.   
 Finally, through the use of regression analysis this inquiry attempts to establish in 
each case the relationship between the dependent variable of nominee approval and the 
independent variables of nominee qualifications, knowledge of nominee’s political views and 
judicial philosophy on certain issues, as well as the party identification of the survey 
respondents.  Through such regression analysis the study asserts a simplistic model of 
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nominee evaluation and approval, which does not envision a public that is both capable of 
understanding complex jurisprudential issues and then assessing the beliefs of potential 
nominees and the degree to which those views agree with their own. The model proposed 
herein asserts that partisanship is not relevant in determining approval in stealth nominations 
and that approval is driven primarily by assessments of qualification. 
Through review of media coverage on the Roberts nominations, it appears that 
Roberts’ successful confirmation should have reenergized the “stealth nominee” model, 
however, it did not and the subsequent Alito and Sotomayor nominations were both of long-
tenured judges.  This may have been in response to a public that expresses a desire for 
qualified jurists, however, it may also be a response to the public’s desire to know the 
political views and judicial philosophy of nominees before they are confirmed.  That is 
particularly the case in the area of reproductive rights and the precedents set by the decision 
in Roe v. Wade and its progeny.    
In the model put forth in this research, it is hypothesized that specific information 
related to the nominee, to the extent that it is known, is also predictive of public approval.  
Regardless of whether that assessment is a fact is personal in nature, such as illegal drug use, 
or whether it is related to ideology, such as beliefs about abortion.  Thus, the less the public 
knows about a nominee, the less likely they are to disapprove.  Therefore, in the highly 
partisan post-Bork era, a president who is seeking to avoid having his nominee fail to meet 
public approval might be advised to nominate a “stealth nominee” to avoid controversy and 
the risk of another Bork-style confirmation hearing.  Moreover, it is hypothesized that that 
while partisanship is a predictive factor of approval in controversial nominations of 
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experienced federal judges, as Gibson and Caldeira found in their model, it plays a smaller 
role, or no role, in approval in the stealth context.   
Finally, the model put forth herein hypothesizes that while specific negative factors 
impact approval of the nominee, the public generally accepts and approves of qualified 
candidates absent some other specific negative factor regarding the nominees.  With 
acceptance of a candidate as “qualified”, the public accepts their appointment regardless of 
the degree of their actual knowledge of the candidate’s ideology or even when they disagree 
with the justice. 
3.1 VARIABLES 
 Based on Kastellec, Lax and Phillips’ model of senate confirmation voting, as well as 
Gimpel and Ringel’s conclusion that public opinion on the approval of nominees is 
meaningful in the Senate confirmation process, the key dependent variable that will be 
measured is approval of nominees by the mass public.  It will be measured in each of three 
separate public opinion polls regarding the nominations of Douglas Ginsburg, David Souter 
and John Roberts to the Supreme Court.     
 Based on the survey data available and the hypotheses that are being tested, the  key 
independent variables for this inquiry include opinions about the qualification of a particular 
nominee for the Supreme Court, opinions about the nominee’s ideology, opinions about 
whether more should be known about the views of nominees, and the party identification of 
the survey respondents.  While previous research has already established links between the 
evaluation or approval of the President and approval of the nominee, each of the surveys 
upon which this research is based does not included this data.  In cases of high presidential 
approval ratings, the President may serve as a cue for the public in forming their opinions 
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regarding a nominee.  In each of the nominations studied in this paper, the nominating 
president was Republican.  Thus, party identification could still allow the president to serve 
as a cue for opinion formation.  I do not assert, however, nor provide data to support the 
degree of approval that the individual nominating presidents enjoyed at the time of selecting 
and announcing the nominees or the role presidential approval might have in approval of the 
Supreme Court nominee. 
While in certain controversial, high-profile nominations race and gender have been 
factors that influenced opinion formation, those nominations involved the nomination of 
minority candidates such as the Clarence Thomas nomination (Mansbridge and Tate 1992).  
Since the nominations involved in this inquiry do not involve women or blacks, this was not 
a focus the inquiry.  It is for that reason that the research stressed the other identified 
independent variables of ideology and party identification.   
3.2 MEASUREMENT 
 The variables in this research have been measured through a series of public opinion 
research polls where respondents were questioned in phone interviews pursuant to a script.  
Each of the polling scripts varied slightly based on the inquiries being conducted by the 
polling organization, but there was commonality between these three public opinion polls 
which spanned the period from 1987 to 2005.  The items in the opinion polls include among 
others the following: 1) Do you approve of the candidate’s nomination to the Supreme 
Court?  2) Would you say that the nominee’s qualifications should lead to their confirmation 
as a Supreme Court justice? 3) Do you think the nominee should state his opinion on 
abortion? and 4) Do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent or 
what?  Depending on the survey question being analyzed, the type and level of measurement 
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varies.  The data generated in the three surveys is generally, nominal and ordinal data, with 
very little interval or ratio scale data. 
3.3 DATA 
 The surveys to be utilized were developed and implemented by ABC News, Chilton 
Research Services (the historical research arm of ABC News) and Taylor Nelson Sofres 
Intersearch.  Each of the surveys were developed and implemented for ABC News and/or the 
Washington Post newspaper.  The households in the survey were selected by random-digit 
dialing.  The respondent within the household was chosen by the adult living in the house 
and present who last had a birthday.  Thus, the data is not original data collected for the 
purpose of this inquiry, yet it was collected pursuant to common professional standards of 
polling research. 
While opinion data was sporadically collected with regard to the confirmation of 
Supreme Court justices historically, it was only in the past couple of decades that such data is 
widely available.  In response to President Reagan’s controversial nomination of Robert Bork 
to the Supreme Court, news organizations like ABC News and the Washington Post began 
collecting significant amounts of data on Supreme Court nominees.  Traditionally, each poll 
was idiosyncratic to the specific issues of the nominee (e.g. Ginsburg: drug use, conflict of 
interest and wife’s professional acts; Bork: Watergate, racism, and sexism; Thomas: race, 
affirmative action, and sexual harassment), but the Bork nomination and the post-Bork era 
also set the stage for the war over the ideological direction of the court.  Thus, survey 
research regarding subsequent nominees, in addition to certain idiosyncratic questions, 
pursues a more general analysis of issues such as approval, qualification and ideological 
questions about nominees. 
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In completing their research, Gimpel and Wolpert relied on opinion surveys regarding 
Rehnquist, Bork, Souter and Thomas nominations.  They pointed out that the data for other 
nominations including "Ginsburg, Breyer, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy were either 
unavailable or did not contain sufficient information for analysis (Gimpel and Wolpert, 
165).”  In an effort to eliminate some of the inconsistency of early surveys, and to limit the 
scope of the inquiry, the data sets used in this research are confined to relatively recent 
nominees to the Court.  While earlier survey data is available through the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) at the University of Michigan, in 
analyzing “stealth nominees” it make sense to limit the inquiry to post-Bork nominees and in 
particular Ginsburg, Souter and Roberts. 
 While there is significant consistency among the three surveys, it is important to 
acknowledge that the three surveys were developed independently over nearly two decades.  
Therefore, there is also variation in the questioning that was utilized.  Because of this 
problem of survey sections which are too idiosyncratic to the specific issues of a particular 
nomination, I attempt to limit my inquiry to those areas of questioning which are the most 
consistent across the three nominations.   
 Additionally concerns exist regarding the fact that the timing of the surveys, and thus 
the collection of data, was not consistent to the same point in the nomination process.  In 
particular, the Ginsburg survey data was before his nomination to the Court was made 
official, while the Roberts data was collected after he had been officially nominated to the 
position as an Associate Justice, but before his nomination was withdrawn and he was 
nominated to the position of Chief Justice.  Thus, the collection of data and particularly the 
timing of when during the nomination process the data was collected is problematic.  Since 
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one minor aspect of this research is the public's desire to know more about the views of 
nominees, it would have been ideal if the surveys had been conducted at approximately the 
same time during the nomination process.  Unfortunately such consistency is not possible 
based on the data which is available, however, it does not appear to have any measureable 
effect on the ability to create a basic predictive model of mass public approval. 
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CHAPTER 4. DATA ANALYSIS 
 The initial analysis for each of the nominations involves descriptive statistics of what 
the public opinion is on various inquiries asked in the survey.  The examination includes 
whether variations occurred between the three polls and to what degree they varied.  One 
issue that it raises is whether it might be appropriate in future polling to develop consistent 
questions regarding ideology of nominees and whether we might attempt to separate political 
views of nominees from the judicial philosophy of nominees.  In their recent scholarship on 
the Alito nomination Gibson and Caldeira were able to maintain consistent lines of inquiry in 
multiple polls, which might serve as a guide for future survey research in this area.  Due to 
the generally accepted ignorance of the public by most scholars, it is unlikely that they would 
push for questions that distinguish between ideology and judicial philosophy.  It is assumed 
that most respondents would not have evaluated nominees at that level of distinction, or 
appreciate a variation of that nature when questioned as part of a telephone interview.  Thus, 
it might not be a meaningful distinction. 
 Following the descriptive analysis of each individual data set, correlations are 
examined between variables within the individual data sets.  In particular, the correlations 
stressed include: approval and variables regarding qualification of candidates and nominee 
ideology. To the extent possible from the data, the inquiry analyzes whether the public has 
concerns about their knowledge of the nominees’ beliefs.   
 Finally, through linear regression I attempt to examine a model which predicts of the 
relationship between the dependent variable of public approval of the nominee and various 
independent variables, including nominee ideology and qualification. 
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4.1 DOUGLAS GINSBURG 
 In the fall of 1987, Douglas Ginsburg spent less than two weeks as a nominee for the 
United States Supreme Court.  Due to the brevity of his nomination and the survey data 
available, this nomination is often overlooked or ignored by researchers.  Most researchers 
have concentrated on the nominations and confirmation hearings for Robert Bork or Clarence 
Thomas instead.  The Ginsburg nomination, however, is interesting for several reasons.  
First, it was the first nomination in the so called “post-Bork era”. Second, due to its brevity, it 
gives us insight into how quickly opinions are formed and what factors might shape those 
early opinions.  Third, it further clarified the public’s beliefs about what are appropriate 
considerations, including personal lifestyle, qualifications, and ideology, in the selection of a 
Supreme Court Justice. 
The data utilized in this paper were made available by the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research.  The data utilized are known as the ABC 
NEWS GINSBURG POLL, NOVEMBER 1987.  They were originally collected by Chilton 
Research Services, a subsidiary of ABC News.1  The poll was taken in the days following 
President Reagan’s announcement of his intent to nominate District of Columbia Circuit 
Court Judge Douglas Ginsburg to fill the vacancy on the United States Supreme Court 
created by the retirement of Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell.  The sample was drawn by 
the Random Digit Dialing Method from the contiguous forty-eight United States.  The 
researchers then interviewed the person at home who was over 18 and had most recently had 
                                                 
1
 Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
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their birthday.  This sampling method, though subject to certain criticisms, is a “theoretical 
well based” model (Rucinski 1993, 582). 
 While not typically discussed as a stealth nominee, Ginsburg was nominated to the 
Supreme Court with very little judicial experience.  He had been a professor at Harvard Law 
School for nearly a decade and had spent three years in the Reagan administration before 
President Reagan appointed him the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 
1986.  It was less than one year later that President Reagan nominated Douglas Ginsburg for 
a position of Associate Justice on the Supreme Court. 
In examining Ginsburg’s brief nomination, the first statistic of note is the fact that 
polling data show a full 71.4 percent of the respondents expressed an opinion about 
Ginsburg’s nomination. This is much higher than the 36.2 percent of respondents expressing 
an opinion about the Rehnquist nomination in 1986 or the 27.5 percent of respondents who 
had an opinion about Bork early in his nomination process (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996). 
While opinion expression about Clarence Thomas peaked at 95.4 percent in October of 1991, 
in the days following his nomination 78.8 percent of the public had an opinion about him 
(Gimpel and Wolpert 1996).  From this it is clear that nominations to the Supreme Court 
have become much more salient than in the pre-Bork era.  One exception to this trend in the 
post-Bork era of greater scrutiny was the confirmation of David Souter in 1990, which is 
discussed later.  According to data from an NBC News Poll relied upon by Gimpel and 
Wolpert, only 19.3 percent of respondents had an opinion about Souter (Gimpel and Wolpert 
1996, 169). 
In further support of the proposition that Supreme Court nominations are salient 
issues for the general public in the post-Bork era, fully 78.6 percent of those questioned 
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responded that they had heard or read about the nomination of Ginsburg to the Supreme 
Court and knew something about it.  In clarifying this response, however, only 29.7 percent 
of those who responded that they had heard or read something about the nomination 
characterized what they knew about Ginsburg as “a lot” or even “some.”  This left just more 
than 70 percent of respondents who characterized their knowledge of Douglas Ginsburg as 
“not much”, “almost nothing” or “no opinion”. Thus, while a general awareness of nominees 
exists, the ABC News Ginsburg Poll, November 1987 supports the idea that, in-depth 
evaluation of nominees and their ideology is largely restricted to elite discussions and the 
chattering classes.  
 Of those who responded that they had any knowledge at all of Ginsburg, only 50.2 
percent of them were willing to state opinions on whether Ginsburg was qualified to be on 
the Supreme Court.  Similarly only 51.2 percent of those with any knowledge were willing to 
express an opinion as to whether Ginsburg was experienced enough to sit on the highest 
Court.  This supports the argument that in-depth substantive evaluation of nominees does not 
take place among the general public.  One factor that might make these numbers lower than 
some of the other survey data in the post-Bork era is the brevity of Ginsburg’s nomination 
and the lack of Senate hearings or debates about it. 
 While the public was knowingly ignorant of Ginsburg’s qualifications and 
experience, there were several factors related to his nomination of which they were widely 
aware.  The most noticeable factor, and the factor for which Ginsburg’s confirmation is best 
known, was his acknowledgement that he had used marijuana.  Of the sample that had any 
knowledge of Ginsburg, 91.4 percent were aware of Ginsburg’s drug use.  Not nearly as 
striking, but also of note was the fact that 58.9 percent were aware of a potential violation by 
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Ginsburg of conflict of interest rules during the time he worked at the Department of Justice.  
While not as large a percentage as those aware of his drug use, this is a substantial number of 
respondents aware of a relatively obscure aspect of his nomination. 
 Each of these pieces of data supports that use of the stealth strategy by Presidents will 
help to avoid controversy given the opportunity to nominate a candidate for the Court.  While 
the public is generally aware of nominees, their scrutiny is generally superficial absent some 
specific piece of provocative data such as drug use or conflict of interest.  The more private 
of a career and life the nominee has lived, the less likely they are to elicit disapproval.  While 
78.6 percent of the respondents had knowledge of Ginsburg and 71.1 percent of respondents 
had an opinion about his nomination, the poll showed that Ginsburg had the approval of 61.4 
percent of the respondents who had an opinion on his nomination.  This was notably lower 
than other Supreme Court nominees have enjoyed.  In their research Gimpel and Wolpert 
found that approval ratings for their sample, which included Rehnquist, Bork, Souter, and 
Thomas, ranged from 72.3 percent to 40.5 percent.  Of their sample, however, only one of the 
four justices had an approval rating below that of Ginsburg, which was Robert Bork’s 40.5 
percent (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996, 171). 
 Obviously key to the data in the Ginsburg nomination was public opinion regarding 
marijuana use and suitability for the United States Supreme Court.  Based on the data from 
the survey sample, 71.9% of the sample said that prior drug use should not bar appointment 
to the United States Supreme Court.  It is also clear, however, that opinion on whether drug 
use was a relevant consideration for approval was strongly correlated with approval of his 
nomination.  In Table 1 that follows, we observe a statistically significant -.472 correlation 
between approval of Ginsburg and those who believe marijuana use should bar appointment 
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to the Court. Additionally, strong positive correlations exist between public approval and 
those who believe that Ginsburg was qualified enough and experienced enough for the Court.   
 
Table 1: Correlation of Ginsburg Approval with Factors Potentially Related to Opinion 
Formation 
 Approval of Ginsburg Nomination 
 
Marijuana use should bar Supreme Court appointment 
 
-.472 ** 
 
Ginsburg is qualified .708 ** 
 
Ginsburg has adequate experience .518 ** 
 
Part y Identification .022 
 
Ginsburg’s ideology is liberal versus conservative .171 
 
Note: For this correlation all samples have observed values without missing data so the N=83. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
As is seen in Table 1, however, party identification is unrelated to the respondents’ approval 
of Ginsburg’s nomination.  This is very interesting in light of how politicized Supreme Court 
nominations have become.  As a society and according to the research, the general sense is 
that public opinion about potential justices is heavily influenced by party identification.  In 
their examination of attitudes toward controversial Supreme Court nominees, Gimpel and 
Wolpert found that party identification was not related to activating opinions about a 
nominee, but that it was a significant factor in determining approval (Gimpel and Wolpert 
1996).  They showed that the effect of partisanship on approval varied based on other factors 
about the nominee (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996).  Similarly, Gibson and Caldeira found party 
identification predictive of nominee approval in the Alito nomination as well (Gibson and 
Caldeira 2010).  In the case of Douglas Ginsburg’s nomination, party identification might 
have been counterbalanced by the fact that he had admitted using marijuana.  This is 
particularly true since that was one of the most widely known characteristics about the 
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nominee.  His drug use (which he repudiated during his nomination as wrong) might have 
turned off social conservatives in the Republican Party and led Democrats to believe that 
Ginsburg would be a moderate on social issues.  Moreover, the fact that Ginsburg’s 
nomination was so short-lived, likely prevented some of the partisan posturing that normally 
takes place during the confirmation hearings on controversial nominees.  Such partisan 
political campaigning might have had an effect on the relationship between approval and 
party identification. 
As shown in the data, there was a significant negative association between an opinion 
that drug use alone should be enough to keep a nominee off the Supreme Court and 
Ginsburg’s approval.  This relationship appears very similar to the negative association 
between the opinion that someone who has used drugs should not be allowed to serve on the 
Supreme Court and Ginsburg’s approval.  This relationship might also be a basis for why 
party identification did not have a stronger relationship with Ginsburg approval. 
 In attempting to develop a predictive model for public approval in the context of 
stealth nominations I note that there was not even a correlation between the respondent’s 
assessment of Ginsburg’s ideology and their approval.  In the model set forth herein and 
described in the results of Table 2, I sought to predict approval of Ginsburg based on the 
respondents’ answers about Ginsburg’s ideology, his experience, the respondent’s party 
identification and their perceived depth of knowledge of Ginsburg.  As we can see in Table 2, 
the R-square indicates that such a model would predict .347 of the variance in the dependent 
variable of nominee approval by the general public.  
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 Table 2: Ideology, Experience, Party ID and Depth of Knowledge Model as Predictive 
of Ginsburg Approval   
Dependent  
Variable 
 
Ginsburg Approval 
Independent  
Variables 
 
Ginsburg Liberal 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.019 
(0.152) 
Ginsburg experienced 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.543** 
(0.228) 
Party ID 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.137 
(0.137) 
Depth of knowledge about Ginsburg 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.063 
(0.144) 
 
R2 
 
0.347 
Note: Throughout the tables, standard errors are presented in parentheses, and standardized coefficients (B) are 
given together with regression coefficients. The levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows, unless 
indicated otherwise.  N=83. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
 
As can be seen in the above regression results, public assessment of Ginsburg’s ideology, 
party identification, and the public’s self-perceived depth of knowledge about Ginsburg were 
not predictive of approval.  Not a single one of those factors was statistically significant in 
predicting approval.  Based on the available data, the key fact of this model in determining 
approval was the public’s assessment of whether Ginsburg was adequately qualified to sit on 
the United States Supreme Court.  In fact, despite a general ignorance of Ginsburg, as 
indicated earlier in this section, and very superficial knowledge of him, lack of knowledge 
was not statistically significant in influencing approval.  Thus, while Ginsburg’s nomination 
was never formalized and he withdrew from consideration for the Supreme Court, it is worth 
noting that he had general approval among the people and it was driven by perceptions of his 
experience in the legal profession, despite almost no federal judicial record.  Thus, this use of 
the stealth nomination appears to have been initially successful in securing public approval 
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and might well have put Ginsburg on the Court, except for the report on National Public 
Radio by Nina Totenberg which publicized Ginsburg’s prior marijuana use.   
 One final note on the Ginsburg nomination is that we have no indication of Senate 
attitudes or potential votes since his nomination was quickly withdrawn following the media 
coverage of his past marijuana use.  Thus, unlike the other nominees considered herein, we 
do not have the results of a confirmation vote to compare Senate approval to public approval 
of the nominee.  
4.2 DAVID SOUTER 
 As was mentioned before, David Souter’s nomination by President George H.W. 
Bush is generally considered the quintessential example of a “stealth nomination.”  While 
some in the media have recently used the term to describe the evasive answers given by 
nominees to the Supreme Court during the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings or tactics 
employed to conceal information about the nominee, in the context of this paper and in the 
scholarship generally it means the nomination of candidate with a limited federal judicial 
record.  As the original “stealth nominee” discussed in the literature and the essence of the 
strategy, I believe that it is imperative to examine the strategy in light of the opinions we can 
measure about his nomination and what factors are predictive of public approval. 
 David Souter’s nomination to United States Supreme Court was made by President 
George H.W. Bush only three months after he had been unanimously confirmed by the 
Senate for a position on the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  His rapid 
ascension through the federal judiciary came following a legal career split primarily between 
the New Hampshire Attorney General’s Office and the trial and appellate courts of New 
Hampshire.  Even though Souter had spent seven years on the state Supreme Court in New 
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Hampshire, his opinions from that body gave little insight into how he would rule on cases 
regarding federal law and the balance of powers under the United States Constitution. 
The data utilized in this section of the paper were also made available by the Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research.  The data utilized are known as the 
ABC News/Washington Post Souter Nomination Poll, July 1990.  They were originally 
collected by Chilton Research Services, a subsidiary of ABC News.2  The poll was taken 
following President George H.W. Bush’s nomination of David Souter to the United States 
Supreme Court.  The methodology of the survey was similar to that of the ABC News 
Ginsburg Poll.   
In contrast to the Douglas Ginsburg nomination discussed in the previous section, 
David Souter’s nomination was only slightly less known among the public.  Fully 63.6 
percent of respondents in the ABC News poll said that they had heard or read about Souter, 
after his nomination by the President.  This relatively high percentage in comparison to 
Ginsburg is even more significant in light of the fact that unlike Ginsburg’s drug use, there 
were no scandalous allegations about the nomination of a quiet state court judge from New 
Hampshire.  Unfortunately, due to changes in the survey utilized by ABC News and Chilton 
Research, we do not have data on the degree of knowledge that respondents believed they 
had in the case of the Souter nomination.  Thus, on this one point we are limited in 
comparisons between the two data sets. 
 Whereas illicit drug use and conflicts of interest were idiosyncratic considerations to 
the Ginsburg nomination, the Souter nomination falls into the battle over the Court with 
                                                 
2
 Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
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regard to the jurisprudence of abortion and reproductive rights.  Since that was the case, the 
Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and views on abortion were central inquiries in this data set.  
In response to whether they approved of the Court’s ruling in Roe v. Wade, the majority in 
the sample expressed a favorable opinion 59.7 percent.  
While the public was slightly less aware of the Souter nomination than that of 
Douglas Ginsburg, they held a significantly higher opinion with regard to whether the Senate 
should confirm Souter to the Court, with 76 percent of respondents saying that Souter should 
be confirmed. Such a public approval of 76 percent is even higher than the range discussed 
by Gimpel and Wolpert in their research on the Rehnquist, Bork, Souter, and Thomas 
nominations, which ranged from 72.3 percent to 40.5 percent (Gimpel and Wolpert 1996,  
171).  Gimpel and Wolpert’s highest measured approval rating of 72.3 percent was also for 
Souter, but in their research they relied on different survey data, the CBS News/New York 
Times poll from August of 1990. 
 During the Ginsburg nomination, the ABC News survey found that 65 percent of 
respondents believed that Senate consideration and approval of the nominee should include 
the nominee’s political views in addition to qualifications and experience.  Just three years 
later, however, during the case of David Souter’s nomination, that position dropped to 49.7 
percent.  At that level, for the survey sample size of 739 respondents, 50 percent is within the 
confidence interval for an alpha of .05 and an alpha of .01.  Thus we can no longer say with a 
certainty whether the public believes that politics should or should not be considered by the 
Senate.  
While we cannot say with certainty whether the public believed that the Senate 
should have considered Souter’s political views in evaluating his nomination, it is certain the 
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public believed that they should have questioned him about those views.  In the case of 
Souter’s position on abortion, 65.9 percent of respondents believed that the Senate Judiciary 
Committee should question Souter about that.  Moreover, 54.4 percent of the public believed 
that despite George H.W. Bush’s assertions that he never asked Souter about his political or 
legal views, he would have.  In contrast to the fact that most in the public believed that the 
President and the Senate Judiciary Committee should have questioned Souter about his 
political views on abortion and his legal views on Roe v. Wade, the majority of respondents 
55.1 percent asserted that they did not believe that the Senate should consider Souter’s 
abortion views in their evaluation of the nominee.  Thus, it would appear that they do not 
believe a so-called litmus test on abortion should drive confirmation.  Thus, while 
respondents clearly assert that we should know a nominee’s ideology and views on political 
and legal issues, they simultaneously appear to assert that it should not be considered, at least 
in the case of abortion, in confirmation voting. 
Once again, however, it should be noted that while people willing to express an 
opinion on approval favored confirmation roughly three to one, a greater number of those 
surveyed responded either “No Opinion” or “Refused to Answer”.  Those responses made up 
48.1 percent of the total 778 surveyed.  This is particularly important in that such a sense of 
ignorance or ambivalence is part of the tactics of the stealth strategy. 
With the voting public remaining generally ignorant or ambivalent about Souter’s 
nomination, the Senate had less concern for voter accountability.  Factoring in that of those 
who were not ignorant or ambivalent the approval rating was 76 percent, it is not surprising 
that the confirmation vote in the full Senate was 90 to 9.  While he did not receive unanimous 
confirmation from the Senate like his colleagues Antonin Scalia or Anthony Kennedy, it was 
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a much more unified Senate than in the recent string of confirmation votes, including the 
confirmation of John Roberts as Chief Justice in 2005. 
In examining the relationship between variables from the Souter survey, it starts to 
establish a pattern consistent with the Ginsburg results.   The following table, Table 3, shows 
the correlation between variables of ideology, experience/qualification, party identification 
and whether more should be asked of the nominee by the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
 
Table 3: Correlation of Souter Approval with Factors Potentially Related to Opinion 
Formation 
 Approval of Souter Nomination 
 
Souter is qualified 
 
0.315** 
 
Approve of appointing a conservative to the Court  0.245** 
 
Part y Identification 0.056 
 
Should the Senate question Souter on his views regarding abortion? -0.138** 
 
Note: For this correlation all samples have observed values without missing data so the N=744 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Thus, as can be seen in the correlations, party identification, is once again not significantly 
correlated with approval in the case of stealth nominees.  This is more surprising in the case 
of Souter because many assumed that the lack of correlation between party identification and 
approval of Ginsburg was driven by the fact that marijuana use was seen as more offensive or 
inappropriate to conservative elements of the Republican Party.  In the case of Souter there 
was no such factor to highlight with regard to why party identification was not more 
correlated with approval.  Approval of Souter’s alleged conservative ideology was positively 
correlated with approval of his nomination, but not as substantially as whether the 
respondents believed he was qualified to sit on the Court.  Thus, while the media and 
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politicians were arguing about an ideological battle for the Court, public approval was 
actually more closely correlated with the desire to have a bench populated with qualified 
jurists.  Finally, the correlations in Table 3 show that a negative correlation existed between 
approval of Souter and the desire to have the Senate question him regarding his views on 
abortion.  Thus, it appears that a certain segment of the population did not support approval 
absent specific knowledge of Souter’s views on abortion. 
 In attempting to establish a predictive model of public approval based on the data 
available, I did a linear regression of the data from the ABC News/Washington Post Souter 
Nomination Poll which were most similar to those examined in the model from Section 4.1 
on Douglas Ginsburg.  The results of that regression are provided in Table 4 that follows.  In 
the case of the Souter nomination, this predictive model is less powerful in its ability to 
predict public approval generally, with an R-square of .127 in comparison to the similar 
model from the Ginsburg nomination, which had an R-square of .347.  In the following Table 
4, however, we observe that certain elements of that model are substantial predictors of 
approval at levels that are statistically significant. 
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Table 4: Ideology, Qualification, Party ID and Depth of Knowledge Model as Predictive 
of Souter Approval 
Dependent  
Variable 
 
Souter Approval 
Independent  
Variables 
 
Approve of a conservative 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.160** 
(0.048) 
Souter Qualified 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.265** 
(0.032) 
Party ID 
b 
(SE) 
 
0.051 
(0.093) 
Should Senate question Souter about 
abortion 
b 
(SE) 
 
 
-0.085 
(0.229) 
 
R2 
 
0.127 
Note: Throughout the tables, standard errors are presented in parentheses, and standardized coefficients (B) are 
given together with regression coefficients. The levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows, unless 
indicated otherwise.  N=744. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
 
Within this model, believing that Souter is qualified remains the strongest factor in 
determining public approval with a t-score of 7.542, and a standardized beta of .265 with a p-
value < .001.  This mirrors the analysis from the Ginsburg nomination in which the survey 
results support the concept that mass public approval of Supreme Court nominees is driven 
primarily by a desire for qualified as jurists to handle the cases that come before them 
judiciously.  Of additional note, however, is the fact that ideological control of the court, as 
discussed extensively in the media and elite debates of that time is actually a strong 
predictive factor of general public support as well.  With a t-score of 4.574, a standardized 
beta of .169 and a p-value < .001, it is only slightly less predictive of approving Souter’s 
nomination than the desire for a qualified jurist.  
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4.3 JOHN ROBERTS 
 In July of 2005, Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced her intent to 
retire from the Supreme Court upon the confirmation of her successor.  In response to that 
opening on the Court, President George W. Bush nominated John Roberts to fill her position.  
While Robert’s nomination was pending, however, then Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
died, leaving an additional vacancy.  President Bush quickly withdrew John Roberts’ 
nomination to fill Justice O’Connor’s seat on the bench and nominated him to fill the role of 
Chief Justice. 
 When nominated by President Bush, John Roberts was a 50 year old judge who had 
recently been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  Having 
at that point only spent two years as a federal judge, Roberts did not have a long record of 
judicial opinions.  In fact, he authored only 49 opinions in his position on the D.C. Circuit 
Court.  Prior to his judicial appointment to the Court of Appeals, Roberts had spent the 
preceding decade as an appellate litigator in private practice.  The remainder of Robert’s 
professional resume consisted of various positions within the Justice Departments of several 
Republican administrations. 
 With very little in the way of way of written opinions, many anticipated that the 
Roberts confirmation hearings would focus on attempting to discern his judicial philosophy 
and how he might rule on certain hot button issues such abortion.  In fact, his testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee began with a series of questions about his position on 
Roe v. Wade and the role of stare decisis.  Beyond merely presenting as a “stealth nominee” 
in the sense of a limited judicial record, Roberts engaged in a concerted effort during his 
hearing testimony to further obscure and conceal his ideology and beliefs.  He was 
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intentionally vague and non-committal during his testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  He repeatedly express that it would not be appropriate to discuss how he might 
have ruled on past cases or how he would rule in a hypothetical case if he were confirmed to 
the Court.  Thus, he sought to avoid providing any concrete evidence to potential critics on 
whether he was willing to overturn the landmark decisions of the Court such as Roe v. Wade. 
 While demonstrating a commanding knowledge of Supreme Court precedent that is 
not surprising given his extensive experience of arguing cases before the Court as both a 
Deputy Solicitor General and a private practice member of the Supreme Court Bar, his 
testimony regarding the role of the Court in shaping policy was intentionally ambiguous.  He 
refused to articulate a specifically defined judicial philosophy by which he would decide 
cases that came before him should he be confirmed.  Moreover, he repeatedly asserted the 
position that he could not answer how he would rule on certain principles such as federalism 
and the separation of powers in the context of the war powers, absent specific facts of a given 
case.  In doing so, nominee Roberts went beyond the definition of “stealth nominee” as used 
herein and sought to intentionally conceal information relevant to his confirmation.  In doing 
so, however, he was able to maintain uncertainty about his judicial philosophy. 
In July of 2005, following Roberts’ nomination to replace Justice O’Connor on the 
Court, ABC News and the Washington Post gathered public opinion data about the Roberts’ 
nomination. That data is stored by and was made available through the Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research.  The data utilized in this section are known as 
the ABC News/Washington Post Supreme Court Poll, July 2005.  They were originally 
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collected by Taylor Nelson Sofres Intersearch, for ABC News and the Washington Post.3  
The poll was taken following President George W. Bush’s nomination of John Robert to the 
position of Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.  The methodology of the 
survey was similar to that used by Chilton Research and ABC News in each of the previous 
sections.  As in that previous survey research, the data was collected via a random digit 
dialing sampling method.  Respondents were then picked through the strategy of questioning 
the adult home at the time who last had a birthday. 
 In light of the previous research on the general ignorance of the public regarding the 
Court, it is interesting to note that the majority of respondents, in fact 59.3 percent, 
questioned regarding their awareness of the Roberts’ nomination, said that they had been 
following the news regarding the nomination either “very closely” or “somewhat closely”.  
This would seem to follow the general proposition that in the post-Bork era, nominations to 
the Supreme Court are salient aspects of our political system. 
 When questioned about their approval of the Roberts’ nomination in the summer of 
2005, specifically whether the Senate should vote to confirm him, the public strongly 
supported the proposition that the Senate should confirm Roberts’ nomination to the Court.  
In fact, 72.8 percent of respondents believed that he should be confirmed.  Additionally, 
though not to the same degree, 57.6 percent of respondents supported the proposition that 
senators should vote to confirm Roberts if he is considered qualified for the position, 
regardless of whether his judicial philosophy and legal views are contrary to their own.  This 
is an even stronger assertion of depoliticizing the Supreme Court than was present in either 
                                                 
3
 Neither the collector of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
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the Ginsburg or the Souter survey data.  Thus, despite the post-Bork politicization of the 
confirmation process, the public opinion data in the Roberts’ nomination supported a 
contrary conclusion, with the public calling for confirmation even if the views of the 
nominee were contrary to those of the democratically elected Senate.   
Since, well over half of respondents believed that senators should vote for a nominee 
with whom they disagreed, then it would appear that knowing the particulars of a nominee’s 
judicial philosophy or ideology should not be of great importance in shaping the public 
opinion.  In fact, however, when asked about the degree of candidness they expected during 
the confirmation process, 61.7 percent of respondents believed that Roberts should answer 
how he would have ruled on various cases that had come before the Supreme Court.  An even 
greater percent, 64.8 percent believed that during confirmation hearings he should publicly 
state his position on abortion.  Moreover, those positions are strongly correlated with 
approval of the nominee, as can be seen in the following Table 5, where the desire to know 
how he would have ruled on cases had a statistically significant correlation of -.289 and 
knowing his view on abortion had a similarly significant correlation of -.298. 
Table 5: Correlation of Roberts Approval with Factors Potentially Related to Opinion 
Formation 
 Approval of Roberts Nomination 
 
Roberts should be appointed if qualified 
 
.593** 
 
Roberts ideology  
 
-.540** 
 
Part y Identification -.203** 
 
Roberts should answer how he would rule on cases -.289** 
 
Roberts should publicly state his position on abortion -.298** 
 
Note: For this correlation all samples have observed values without missing data so the N=393 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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 As is clear from the above correlations, all of which are statistically significant, there are 
strong relationships between each of these variables examined and public approval.  First, it 
is important to clarify that in the case of the Roberts survey, the question on qualification was 
very different than in the other two surveys examined herein.  Where as in the Ginsburg and 
Souter surveys, the question was specifically are they qualified, in this survey the researchers 
asked whether a senator should vote to confirm Roberts based on “background and 
qualifications” even if the senator disagreed with Roberts’ philosophy and views.  The 
finding that there is a strong positive correlation of .593 between approval of Roberts’ 
confirmation and the belief that confirmation should be based on whether John Roberts is 
qualified regardless of his political beliefs and judicial philosophy is not surprising.  Second, 
although slightly not as strong, there is a negative correlation of -.540 between approval and 
those who believe Roberts is more conservative of a justice than they would have preferred.  
In the correlations set out in Table 5, we see for the first time out of these data sets a 
statistically significant correlation of -.203 between party identification and nominee 
approval.  This would seem to indicate that the politicization of the nomination process, at 
least in the Roberts confirmation, is starting to have a relationship to approval even in stealth 
nominations, and not just in the highly contested nominations of long-tenured federal judges. 
 While public approval of Roberts at 72.8 percent was not substantially different than 
public approval of Souter at 76 percent, the Senate confirmation vote for Roberts dropped to 
78 to 22 (Souter secured 90 votes in favor of confirmation to only 9 against).  Roberts’ 
confirmation occurred as part of the recent string of nominations that came at a time in which 
confirmation votes were much closer.  In comparison, Samuel Alito was confirmed by a vote 
of 58 to 42.   Sonia Sotomayor was confirmed 68 to 31 and the most recent addition of Elena 
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Kagan was confirmed 63 to 37.  Thus, a slightly closer vote on Roberts’ confirmation would 
fit with the general pattern of more closely contested Senate voting on Supreme Court 
nominees. 
 Table 6: Ideology, Qualification, Party ID and Depth of Knowledge Model as 
Predictive of Roberts Approval 
Dependent Variable Roberts Approval 
Independent  
Variables 
 
More conservative than you would like 
b 
(SE) 
 
-0.332** 
(0.023) 
Senate Should confirm if they believe 
Roberts is qualified 
b 
(SE) 
 
 
0.359** 
(0.042) 
Party ID 
b 
(SE) 
 
-0.059 
(0.020) 
Roberts should answer how he would vote 
on cases 
b 
(SE) 
 
 
-0.055 
(0.040) 
Roberts should state his position on 
abortion 
b 
(SE) 
 
 
-0.090 
(0.040) 
 
R2 
 
0.438 
  
Note: Throughout the tables, standard errors are presented in parentheses, and standardized coefficients (B) are 
given together with regression coefficients. The levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows, unless 
indicated otherwise.  N=393. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
In the case of the Roberts nomination the predictive model based on ideology, qualification, 
partisanship and adequacy of information has an R-square of .438, which is by far the 
strongest predictive value of this model in any of the three stealth nominations examined 
herein.  As we examine the predictive value of individual factors within the model, we 
continue to see that party identification is not a statistically significant predictor of nominee 
approval by the public.  Again the two most significant independent variables in predicting 
nominee approval were ideology and qualification.  The analysis showed a t-score of -7.448, 
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and a standardized beta of -.332 with a p-value < .001, for people who believe that Roberts 
was more ideologically conservative than they would have liked.  This indicates, not 
surprisingly, that those finding Roberts more conservative than they would have liked, are 
substantially less likely to approve of him.  Additionally, we see a strong predictive value in 
the t-score of 7.925 and a standardized beta of .359 with a p-value < .001, for those who 
believe a senator should vote to confirm Roberts, if the senator believes Robert is qualified 
regardless of whether he shares Roberts’s judicial views.  Thus, the predictive model set forth 
herein, driven by ideology and qualification regardless of partisanship is strongly predictive 
of public approval in the context of the Roberts nomination. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
An examination of the literature on public approval of Supreme Court nominees, 
highlights the limited scrutiny that “stealth nominations”, that is nominations of candidates 
with little or no experience on the federal bench, have received.  In contrast, numerous 
scholars have explored models of opinion formation and approval in the context controversial 
nominations such as Clarence Thomas or Samuel Alito.  Recognizing this omission in the 
field, this study sought to examine a model which evaluated factors which shape public 
approval in the context of stealth nominations. 
In examining a predictive model of public approval, this paper limited the scope of its 
inquiry to the post-Bork era and to stealth nominees by Republican presidents.  These 
limitations were driven in part by the available data, but also the realities of recent court 
nominations.  While not seeking to advocate the use of a stealth strategy, I sought to evaluate 
factors determining approval and thus explore the efficacy of pursuing a stealth nomination 
given the opportunity to appoint a Supreme Court nominee.  
From the data analysis set out in Chapter 4 we see that the mass public is aware of 
nominations and does scrutinize nominees.  These are not issues concentrated exclusively 
among political elites or the chattering classes.  While the mass public does evaluate 
nominees, that evaluation is generally simplistic and the depth of knowledge regarding 
nominees is superficial.   
While those opinions may lack sophistication, they are politically relevant as 
demonstrated by Kastellec, Lax and Phillips in their model of Senate confirmation voting.  
Moreover, with the innovations in political polarization and party mobilization implemented 
by Karl Rove, the ability to manipulate public opinion regarding the Court and its 
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membership is now not only a concern for individual senators in their vote, but it has 
relevance in the general political landscape and strategies of the parties, particularly on the 
right. 
Indentifying the relevance and significance of mass public opinion on Supreme Court 
nominees, including particularly “stealth nominees”, this paper sought to quantify the 
significance of independent variables in determining public approval of stealth nominees.  
Contrary to the literature on non-stealth nominees, such as Thomas and Alito, the data for 
stealth nominees establishes that party identification is not predictive of nominee approval in 
these specific cases.  This is noteworthy in light of the fact that partisanship was not a 
significant factor for approval in any of the nominations examined despite the media 
arguments regarding politicization of the Court.  It should be noted, however, that each of the 
three nominees noted herein were nominated by Republican presidents and therefore it would 
be prudent and worthwhile to compare this data to a stealth nominee by a Democratic 
president such as the recent Kagan nomination by President Obama. 
In examining the model of public approval herein, it is clear in each of these cases 
that the most significant independent variable in determining public approval was 
qualification of the nominee.  Qualification and/or experience, whichever was measured, is 
the strongest predictive factor in all three cases.  Due to limitations in the survey data, 
however, it is difficult to assess what makes a nominee qualified or experienced enough in 
the eyes of the public.  It is clear from the data, however, that an extensive resume of federal 
court experience is not necessary.  This can be seen from the fact that he public generally 
approved of each of these stealth nominees, who were deemed adequately qualified despite 
very limited federal judicial resumes. 
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The predictive model, while discounting the significance of party identification, does 
indicated that ideology is predictive of public approval at least in the cases of Souter and 
Roberts.  As noted in the analysis of the Ginsburg data, the complicating factor his marijuana 
use and the perceived ideological implications of that may have complicated that factor’s 
predictive value.  In the case of the other two, however, ideology is clearly a significant 
predictive factor.  In Gibson and Caldiera’s work on the Alito nomination, however, they 
demonstrated that so long as the nominee is not perceived as an ideological extremist, the 
public will generally approve of the nominee.  Thus, while ideology is predictive in the 
context of stealth nominees, with their limited federal judicial records it would be more 
difficult to portray them as ideological extremists absent some other specific evidence.    
In each of the stealth examples, despite significant desires by the public to know more 
about the political and legal views of the nominees, particularly on the issue of abortion, and 
negative correlations between those desires and approval, public approval of the nominees 
remained nearly three to one in favor of confirmation.  The desire to know more about the 
ideology was not predictive of approval by the public and in each case the nominations 
examined herein went on to be confirmed in the Senate vote.  Thus, the model predicts 
demonstrates that the desire to know more about a nominee, in and of itself, is not enough to 
undermine public approval. 
Thus, since ideology and ideological extremism is a key factor for determining public 
approval that may be obscured through use of the stealth strategy, it would be efficacious for 
a president, who is seeking to avoid a contentious confirmation battle and the threat of public 
disapproval to derail a nomination, to use the stealth strategy to secure confirmation of a 
nominee.  Additionally, since a lack of sufficient candor and disclosure by stealth nominees 
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does not appear to undermine public support, that too would indicate the efficacy of the 
strategy. 
While the successful courting of public approval and Senate confirmation of 
nominees about whom the public knows little may encourage presidents to engage in the use 
of stealth nominees, it is not without its dangers.  While presidential administrations engage 
in rigorous vetting programs for potential nominees, the stealth nature of one candidate over 
another may also lead to nominating a jurist about whom the administration knows less.  
They should heed the warning of Eisenhower’s experience, in which he later claimed that 
one of his greatest mistakes as president was the decision to name Earl Warren to the Court.  
Many would argue that President George H.W. Bush experienced a similar result with Justice 
Souter. 
Due to the limited scope of this inquiry, further research would be advisable in to 
determine if there is a threshold of experience or adequate evidence of judiciousness that is 
necessary for public approval.  This may be difficult due to the complications of collecting 
public opinion data on Supreme Court nominees, yet it could provide insight into public 
disapproval of the Harriet Miers nomination, despite her limited judicial record.  
Examination of that case might also entail further examination of the interplay between 
public approval, ideology and the role of elites in influencing presidential decision making 
under the Abrahams model.   
Moreover, further research could examine the qualitative effect stealth nominations 
have on the Supreme Court.  Through a systematic analysis of the data provided in the 
Spaeth Database, compiled by Professor Harold Spaeth at Michigan State University as 
updated and currently maintained, researchers may evaluate whether these stealth nominees 
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have led to inferior decisions by the Court and less consistent legal analysis and rationale in 
applying the principles of American Jurisprudence.   An additionally line of inquiry into the 
effects the stealth strategy could examine ABA scores of Supreme Court nominees.  Cursory 
review of the ABA rankings of justices discussed in this study fails to indicate a negative 
effect of stealth nominations.  Every justice confirmed to the Court since Justice Souter, the 
quintessential stealth candidate was rated “well qualified”, with the one except of Justice 
Clarence Thomas who received a rating of “qualified”.  Thus, based on the ratings of the 
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, even the stealth 
nominees rise to the highest of their three levels (not qualified, qualified, well qualified).  
Finally, in further analyzing the use of this stealth nominee strategy, it would be 
beneficial to directly compare the nomination of stealth nominees to a non-stealth nominee in 
a similar timeframe, such as comparing the Roberts nomination data discussed herein to the 
Alito nomination data examined by Gibson and Caldeira.  Thus, while this examination adds 
one small piece of understanding to the model of public approval of Supreme Court 
nominees, much work is left to flush out our understanding of public opinion formation in 
this context. 
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